No doubt, our modest expectations are, in part, protective covering against the kind of disillusionment that assailed us after 1919. We hesitate to hitch our collective wagon exclusively to a star, for we suspect that the help of a B-29 may be needed. We imagine, rightly or wrongly, that we are approaching this peace with a firmer grasp of the realities of power than we had twentyfive years ago, having learned the painful lesson that goodwill is not enough. But it is also true that our hesitancies about the peace and word organization owe a good deal to the fact that (1785-1806) . Some of the material included in this article was first used in a lecture given at the University of Toronto in November, 1944. As will perhaps be apparent to the reader, it was possible to make only minor revisions in the light of the recent general election. 255 
mortgage the pound sterling for the sake of a high level of employment. Policies of social welfare have now become a major concern of every industrial state, and the leftward trend of current opinion in Europe will insure an expansion of such activities. Indeed, the line by which we have marked off the political from the economic is now being rapidly obliterated, and the two are merging as easily as in the mercantilist state. National policies of welfare have ceased to be purely domestic matters and have acquired international implications of immense significance.
II
It is unnecessary here to inquire how Britain fits into these changing world outlines. Obviously the nineteenth century has gone and with it Britain's peculiar pre-eminence. This was not something that lay in the logic of history but the result of a special set of circumstances. In the twilight of the century, Pax Bri- tannica came to an end--and years before the fact was recognized ß by policymakers. The decline in Britain's power position, which was only partly revealed by the First World War, has now become obvious to all. And although none of the major powers will find it a simple matter to adapt its policies to a new station in life, Britain's problem will be especially difficult. In the interests both of their own security and world order the Soviet Union and the United States will have to accept responsibilities of much greater magnitude than in the past. With Britain the imperatives point in the opposite direction. British policy must of necessity be built on more modest dimensions than those blueprinted by Victorian foreign secretaries.
Of the three major powers which will emerge from the war, Russia and the United States belong in a special category. These are the only ones whose credentials to "super-power" status are unquestioned. Britain's claim can be admitted only with some qualification, for, to cite the editor of the London Economist, her Great Power position is dependent on the continued co-operation of the Commonwealth and the absence of active hostility on the part of the United States2 It is the status of a "conditional Great Power" that is assigned to Britain. An American student puts the point even more sharply when he makes Britain's future as a super-power depend on the support of the Commonwealth and the United States--and goes on to remark that "the support of the former can be counted on only if the support of the latter seems assured. "4 As regards global, though not regional, importance only these three need be considered. No other state will have worldwide interests comparable to those of the Big Three, and of these Britain's position, at least in material power, will inevitably be weaker than that of the other two.
"Power" as applied to international politics is a lamentably vague concept, and attempts to measure it are often more interesting than convincing. There are, of course, some moderately objective constituents of power--population, resources, economic organization, geographical location, and the like--elements whose importance would be generally admitted. But beyond these are the imponderables, such as political experience, ability to adjust to new circumstances, capacity for influencing other peoples, and that indefinable social temper which, for lack of a better term, we call morale. The relative significance of these components, moreover, will change from decade to decade. What at one time appeared an incalculable asset may, through technological change, be reduced to a neutral or even a negative factor, while a grave weakness, perhaps the lack of a strategic material, may in the course of a few years cease to matter. Yet with all the qualifications that must be kept in mind, there is no escaping the essential fact. Britain is emerging from the war weaker in both a relative and an absolute sense, save that Germany, her greatest peril in western Europe, will have been eliminated. Nor is there reason to look for a reversal of this trend, to anticipate an improvement in the British p6sition as over against the United States and the Soviet Union. In the immediate future at least, the forces of history are likely to be on the side of the big. battalions. And the Russian and American battalions, especially the former, are staggeringly big. This is not to give undue weight to population as an ingredient of power. Obviously total population is only one of the elements, and not the most important, in determining the rank of a nation in the hierarchy of power. Political disunity or technological backwardness may nullify the advantage of large man-power resources. But unless the disparity in such fields is too great, hegemony will not be unrelated to population.
Something over a quarter of the estimated population of the globe is included within the limits of the British Commonwealth and Empire, a huge mass of approximately 550 million souls. Unfortunately this impressive total is comparatively meaningless as an index of Britain's future influence. To begin with, upwards of 400 million are residents of India and Burma, and these, to say the least, can hardly be regarded as a prospective source of strength. The white population of the Commonwealth amounts to only about 72 million--the European population of the dependent Empire would not add substantially to this figure--as compared with the 130 million inhabitants of the United States and the 174 million of the Soviet Union.
Nor is the European population of the Commonwealth distributed on what a master strategist would consider an optimum basis. Except for the 50 million residents of the United Kingdom, the largest single concentration is in British North America, where Commonwealth interests are already as secure as any reasonable statesman could expect. But in the East the situation is otherwise. From the point of view of their own security Australia and New Zealand are gravely under-populated, though there are differences of opinion as to the additional numbers that could be absorbed. 5 If the Japanese attack had been launched against the two southern Dominions rather than against the United States, the fewer than nine million Anzacs could have done little to repel it. Even with the aid of what American naval power was still available after Pearl Harbor, it was a narrower escape than Australians like to recall. In short, the man-power which can be mobilized in the East has proved inadequate for the protection of Commonwealth interests, and it can no longer be taken for granted that Britain herself will be able to make up the difference.
There is, moreover, no reason to believe that the population gap between Britain and her two major allies will be narrowed during the next generation or two. Unless unforeseen factors intervene, the lead of the United States over Britain will be widened but both will fall still farther behind the Soviet Union. The economic world of which Victorian England was the ruler lies in collapse and will never be rebuilt. For Britain the question is no longer that of regaining leadership. At once more elementary and more complicated, it is rather to maintain the British population on an adequate standard of life and to prevent further deterioration in the British international position. Obviously the essential problem will be to find means of paying for necessary imports, since the nineteenth-century means are no longer available. The prosperity of Victorian economy rested, in a large degree, on overseas capital investment and on the re-investment of income from these foreign holdings. With all the tremendous volume of goods exports, these always fell short of imports, and it was returns from foreign investment and other invisible exports that enabled Britain to balance her international account. Dtiring the First World War some of these foreign holdings were liquidated, and the process of disinvestment went on more or less steadily in the period between the wars. In 10313-8, for example, zt0 per cent of the net imports had to be paid for by invisible exports and • per cent by disinvestment. ø Post-war Britain can no longer lean on such supports as these. For foreign holdings have been liquidated in substantial quantities and what amounts to a foreign war debt (probably aggregating about oe3.5 billion) in the form of "blocked" sterling balances in London, has been acquired. Another element in Britain's invisible exports, financial services, will probably figure less significantly in the future, for, although London will continue to be an important money market, the world's major financial centre has plainly moved across the Atlantic to New York--or Washington. In short, Britain will be faced with a tremendous deficit in her international balance of payments. To bring this account into equilibrium will mean in practice a huge increase in visible exports, for any great and permanent reduction in imports must be dismissed as out of the question. Goods exports of 50 per cent above the pre-war average is the minimum set by most authorities.
Such an achievement is possible only if one assumes two things: first, an expanding volume of international trade, together with a considerable increase in the world demand for British products, and secondly, a level of productive efficiency that will enable British goods to compete with reasonable success in world markets.
It cannot be taken for granted that either of these conditions will be satisfied. The first depends largely on the commercial øE. F. Schumacher, Export t'olicy and Full Employment (London, 1043), 7.
policies of other nations and the temper of the international world. But it should be added that such an expansion is vital to the British not only because of the deficit in their international account but also because of their full employmen, t policy, to which, we may assume, the Labour government will be doubly committed. Unless full employment is to be accompanied by a reduced standard of living, both exports and imports must be stabilized at a high level. A vastly increased volume of international trade is, in short, a primary British interest.
The second condition implies a question about the British industrial system which cannot at present be answered. American observers, with their reverence for low-cost mass production, perhaps tend to underestimate the efficiency of some branches of British industry and to ignore the fact that in certain fields highly mechanized methods might be ill-adapted to British circumstances. What seems reasonably plain, however, is that with the older export staples, the very sinews of Britain's Victorian triumph, there is little basis for optimism, especially little with cotton textiles and coal. But to stress unduly such industries would be to distort the situation. As someone has said, the history of economic progress is the record of decaying industries and the supplanting of them by newer ones. If the post-war world may find little place for British cotton and coal, other industries have less gloomy prospects. Chemicals, rayon, the light metals (although none of the essential ores is present in quantity in the United Kingdom), and machine tools offer exciting possibilities, and the same applies to the wide variety of consumers' goods where workmanship and high quality still count2 ø Britain's industrial future will depend in part on the skill and energy shown in shifting capital and man-power from moribund to newer industries, and the opportunity will come during the period immediately after the war, when a goods-hungry world will be clamouring for products of almost any description. Behind the protective screen of this export boom Britain can accomplish much by way of reorganization and rationalization.
Merely to discuss the question of Britain's destiny in these It was more than a matter of indifference which course British foreign secretaries took, but in these years a wrong decision would not push the country to the edge of disaster.
The redistribution of forces that took place during the eighteenseventies and eighteen-eighties altered the problem that British statesmen had to solve. With a united Germany as the increasingly dominant power on the continent and as the centre of a.system of alliances and understandings, it was only a question of time until the bankruptcy of the mid-century policy should be exposed. The British government was traditionally committed to oppose any overwhelming concentration of power on the continent. But the balance-of-power policy in its pure form, the policy of maintaining equilibrium by encouraging first one group of powers and then another, assumed that Britain could achieve her end without becoming too deeply involved. Paradoxically, if Britain had to abandon her semi-isolation and bind herself irretrievably to a continental combination in order to preserve the balance, that would brand the policy itself as a failure. Although British participation in the Triple Entente was, on the one hand, an attempt to uphold the balance, it was also an admission that the policy had failed. The States as a world power it also marked the beginning of Britain's decline as the dominant power in the Pacific. Although in retrospect one can s•e that these pressures were not a series of isolated episodes but were chapters in the deterioration of Britain's world influence, their significance was not entirely apparent in the years before 191zt. Britain was still the leading world power and one of the major powers of western Europe--and western Europe still the centre of the world. Some of her favoured position she had shared with other aspirants but nothing more ominous than that. And from the victory of the First World War, costly as it was, Britain appeared to have profited in enhanced prestige and security. Germany, her chief rival in western Europe, had been humbled, and Russia, another perennial threat, seemed hopelessly weakened. With the exception of the United States, which evidently did not seek the honour, there were no obvious candidates for world leadership. Altogether, if Englishmen could avert their eyes from the country's economic plight, they might reasonably find a certain satisfaction in the outlook.
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This misapprehension with regard to the power which Britain could summon was responsible for some of the vagaries of British policy during the "twenty years' armistice." British and American policies alike seemed innocent of serious suspicion that the balance of world forces had been radically altered. To some British statesmen it seemed an appropriate time to revert to the balance-of-power philosophy of an earlier day and in partial isolation to preside over the continental equilibrium. n As the strongest military power on the' continent, France to many Englishmen was more menacing than was a prostrate Germany and the kind of guarantees demanded by the French were thought an altogether excessive commitment. A century before Britain had held out encouragement to a defeated France, and now a similar formula was applied, though in a much less positive fashion? Although after the rise of Nazi Germany the two countries drew together as in the years before 1914, it was too late for a genuine balance to be established, given the hesitancies of Anglo-French statecraft and public opinion. The failure of the policy of balance was a measure both of the misconceptions that inspired it and of the disparity between the objectives that Britain sought and the force that she could command. plan, it was not introduced under the happiest of circumstances. By picturing it as a device for balancing the growing strength of Russia, he managed to offend the Russians who were to be checked, the western European democracies who were to be dominated, and those sections of American opinion which are always on the alert to detect Britain in the practice of "power politics! "•4 Such attempts to reinforce the power on which Britain can draw, even if they were to succeed, would by no means redress the balance. What the situation requires, on the part of the other major powers, no less than on Britain's, is an adjustment of policy to the realities of the international world. In the United States, for example, although isolationism of the traditional sort has apparently broken down, the task of formulating a world policy is still to be faced, For Britain the need is perhaps even more urgent. If British might can no longer undertake to patrol the world, as in the nineteenth century, it is important to know where the primary British interests lie and to measure these against the power available to maintain them. Future policy must take account of this basic equation, so largely ignored between the two wars.
IV
Stated broadly--one ought, perhaps, to apologize for the platitude--the fundamental British interests are peace and security and therefore the building of a workable peace mechanism. Of all the major powers Britain is perhaps most predisposed to an international point of view. British public opinion gave to the old League sincere and vigorous support, though there was more than a little wishful thinking about the devotion that it inspired. Subconsciously Englishmen tended to regard the League as a new and organic creation, existing independently of its self-centred members and promising an easy escape from the dilemmas of foreign policy and defence. The world learned something from that experience, and the nations are entering the new security organization determined, perhaps unreasonably, not to expect too much. It is agreed that, at least during an extended transitional period, the success of the project will be in proportion to the harmony existing among the Great Powers and their willingness to make concessions not only to each other but to nations below the super-power rank. In other words, for some time to come Britain's major contribution to international stability will be must be insisted upon. There is, for example, the prestige that accrues to Britain, as well as the power that she wields, as the leading member of the Commonwealth, even though some of the Dominions, more than in the past, will be looking to Washington as well as to London. The cultural leadership which she has enjoyed for centuries, the inventiveness and technical skill of her people (radar and jet propulsion stand as warnings against concluding that these qualities belong only to the past) and the fact that historically Britain has been the home of the values which the war is being fought to preserve--all these are sources of influence in the world of nations.
Less tangible but even more central is the British will-tonational-survival, morale, or whatever one wishes to call it. No doubt it is the result of complicated historical forces, and under some conditions it can take forms which the foreigner finds baffling and even annoying in its innocent assumption of superiority. But in essentials British morale is simply the conviction, rational or irrational, that Britain has always come out on top and any other issue would be unthinkable. The less promising the outlook, the higher British morale will probably rise, as has been magnificently demonstrated during the past five years. A few days after the fall of Tobruk a visitor from America was having tea with an English friend, when the husband of the hostess "blew in from the War Office, looking as-worried as I felt. 'What's giving me a headache,' he said, 'is the Army of Occupation'. "•6 It would be absurd to deny that the confidence which this incident typifies had much to do with saving Britain in the months after Dunkirk, and it would be just as absurd to discount its importance in assuring Britain a place of dignity and power in the post-war world.
There is also the matter of political experience, of which, throughout the centuries, the British nation has accumulated such a rich store. Englishmen have shown themselves marvellously skilled in political devising, in creating serviceable governmental It is ironic that, during the twenty years' truce, British foreign policy was least decisive when dealing with the most rudimentary of all British interests. Only gradually did it appear that the continental balance-of-power formula, which had already failed once, was no solution to the problem of British security. This war has demonstrated the utter vulnerability of Britain to modern weapons, and it has answered, with tragic emphasis, the age-old question, "Is or is not Britain a part of Europe?" Britain is a European nation, in fact, the leading power of western Europe, and in the future British policy must accept that as axiomatic. A limited-liability philosophy covered nineteenth-century relations with the continent adequately enough. Now it is all or nothing.
British security is so closely involved in a satisfactory answer to the continental problem that it must be the primary consideration in British policy. With her global interests, Britain can never cease to be a world power, unless she is ready to face extinction. But in the years to come her world influence is bound to diminish and she will probably be increasingly concerned with Europe, more so, indeed, than for over a century.
A major test of British statesmanship will be the quality of leadership that can be offered to western Europe. Mr. Cyril Connolly puts the point strikingly: "England will find itself in the position of one of those fairy-tale princes who drift into a tournament, defeat a dragon or a wicked knight, and then are obliged to marry the king's daughter and take on the cares of a confused, impoverished, and reactionary kingdom. That kingdom is Europe, premise that zones of special interest are not only inevitable but within limits reasonable enough. The terms "security zone," "sphere of influence," and the like, however, cover a variety of relationships, some of them fairly unobjectionable, others distinctly sinister. Granted that with security spheres the line separating a regional association from a power bloc is difficult to draw. Probably your zone is a power bloc and mine a regional association, though in sober fact most combinations contain elements of both. Certainly such spheres are morally indefensible when the dominant power uses its position to interfere unduly in the domestic affairs of the smaller states. One need only recall the experience of the Metternich system to underline the point. To attempt to exercise too close control over the governments within security zones, to maintain or impose r•gimes clearly repugnant to the peoples concerned not only creates an intolerable situation for the weaker nations but, as it has already threatened to do, rapidly leads to suspicion and distrust among the Great Powers themselves.
Such objections would hardly apply to a free association of western European democracies within the larger security organization, an association whose major purpose would be neither to balance Russian influence nor to enhance British power. The primary aim would be the security of its members, for the war has demonstrated the strategic unity of the area and has emphasized the mutual dependence of the various countries. The postwar period will reveal a similar need for co-operation in the field of economic policy. Furthermore, the attitude of other powers towards a western European association may prove somewhat less forbidding than in the past, for the conflict between regionalism and universalism in security arrangements, if not resolved, has been partly clarified. The attempt made at Yalta to prevent the partition of Europe into zones of special influence proved during the succeeding weeks to have failed. Plainly the Russians were not inclined to give up their special position in central and eastern Europe or to deny themselves in advance a similar zone in the Far East. In the western hemisphere the Act of Chapultepec again stressed regionalism as a cardinal point in American foreign policy. And, although the United Nations charter is concerned chiefly with general security arrangements, regional interests could be by no means ignored at San Francisco. In short, regionalism must be accepted as a factor in the future security system. For, should Britain at any time lack the surplus of strength necessary for the protection of her legitimate interests in the Far East, American power will have to undertake their defence. In the Far East, in a greater degree than elsewhere, the lead will be played by the United States but Britain's will be more than a "bit" part. The two nations will, of course, be trade rivals in the East as elsewhere, and there may be a difference of views as to the destiny of former Japanese possessions, Hongkong, and other territories. Yet the points of conflict are trivial as compared with the zone of agreement, and if the two powers will co-operate on a far-sighted, liberal solution of the problems of the Pacific, there need be no great concern about power ratios.
VI
It is all but impossible to sketch the changing perspectives of the contemporary world without using colours more lurid than the scene justifies. To speak of the decline of Britain as a world power seems inevitably to imply decadence, to endorse the current absurdity, "Britain is through!" No conclusion could be less warranted. Counting England out is an old and fashionable international diversion in which many continental politicians and soldiers have taken part, to their later regret. And some uneasiness must be the lot of one who in print ventures to assign to Britain a future status below that of "top nation," in the now classic words of zo66 and All That. But in sheer power, it is clear, Britain no longer stands in the very front rank, and British foreign policy must reconcile and adapt itself to that fact. The nation's reconstruction problem, staggering enough in all conscience, is both more critical and more complicated than those of her two chief allies.
For in a sense Russia and the United States will be moving with the currents of world change, while the British must be prepared to breast some of these same currents. The revolution which has diminished the importance of western Europe, including Britain, has magnified that of the other two powers, and not the least of the post-war trials through which the British must pass is that of adjusting themselves psychologically to this unfamiliar condition.
Yet there is a danger, which this paper has not wholly escaped, of being over-occupied with questions of material power. We have been so determined not to be quixotic about the post-war world, not to expect the impossible, that we may have set our sights too low. We hesitate to believe that victory was achieved by the United Nations simply because in the end they could mobilize superior striking power. It is our instinctive conviction that men and ideas, moral leadership, had something to do with the outcome. We recall that only five years ago the immortal Few showed the apparent logic of force to be anything but infallible. And if the victory of the United Nations is to be of more than negative significance, it must mark a stage in the transition, to borrow Bagehot's phrase, from the age of conflict to the age of discussion in the international world.
The nation that will take the initiative boldly and imaginatively in this movement can gain a moral ascendancy impossible for those to whom material power is itself the ultimate. There are signs that the common men and women of Britain are not indifferent to the challenge, and the obligation is heavy on their new government to give the lead to the democratic forces of Europe and to merit their confidence. For the English tradition, which has established its association of free communities overseas, now faces the greatest task of all, that of laying the foundations of the world community.
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